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Abstract: This study examines long run and causal relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
economic development in Nigeria using annual data from 1970-2011. Both sub-national expenditures 
ratio and sub national revenue ratio were used to measure fiscal decentralisation in Nigeria. The result 
of the analysis showed that the federally allocated expenditures to sub-national has been greater than 
its corresponding allocated revenue in Nigeria and this has became pronounced from the year 1999 up 
till date under the administration of a dominant political party known as People Democratic Party 
(PDP) in Nigeria. Using VECM, the study found that fiscal decentralisation is cointegrated with 
economic development in Nigeria. That is, there is a long run relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and economic development. The results from the VEC granger causality test showed 
a unidirectional causality run from economic development to fiscal decentralization i.e. economic 
development granger causes fiscal decentralization (only sub-national revenue decentralization ratio) 
in Nigeria. By implication, economic benefits derived from fiscal decentralization are the products of 
economic development simply because as economy is developing, these benefits emerge in Nigeria. 
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Introduction 
Fiscal decentralisation which is the devolution of expenditures functions and tax 
revenue sources from the national government to sub-national government has 
been on the policy agendas of most developing and transitional economies as well 
as OECD countries in the recent decade. Both theoretical and empirical estimation 
have yielded inconclusive results on fiscal decentralisation-growth nexus. 
Notwithstanding, one of the issues which has not been fully explored is the 
question of whether rapid development of the economy is fiscal decentralized-led 
or growth driven. This question is germane because the determination of the 
direction of causality between fiscal decentralization and performance of the 
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economy will enable the policy-makers to formulate appropriate development 
polices. Some literatures have reported that economic growth as a function of fiscal 
decentralisation through Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique of analysis 
because efficient resource allocation which lead to sustained increased in per 
capital income as the sole objectives of fiscal decentralisation. Other studies 
however, still showed that fiscal decentralisation depends on the level of economic 
(Letelier, 2003; Oates 1985 among others) because higher income per capital 
gained from the quality of public goods and services as the basis for additional 
expenditures used for the constitution of a new decentralised system and as a result 
there arise the possibility of reversal causality and endogeneity problem between 
fiscal decentralisation and economic growth (Thiessen 2003; Xie, et al. 1999; 
Zhang and Zou 1998) which has not been catered for except the study of limi 
(2005) and this will undoubtedly produce spurious regression analysis. 
Moreover, attention of previous empirical studies has not been adequately shifted 
on the nature and direction of the causal relationship between decentralization and 
economic growth (Breuss and Eller, 2004) and even few existing studies have 
reported contradicting results. Roy and Johannes (1992), for example, argue that as 
economic growth causes fiscal decentralisation because as economies grow and 
mature, economic benefits from fiscal decentralization will manifest. Therefore, 
economic growth comes first before fiscal decentralisation. According to Oates 
(1999) however But not all would agree (to that conclusion). More generally, it 
seems to me, we must regard intergovernmental structure as part of a larger 
political and economic system that both influences and is determined by the 
interplay of a variety of political and economic forces. It may well be that fiscal 
decentralization itself has a real contribution to make to improved economic and 
political performance at different stages of development. 
No consensus has been developed in the literature over the direction (Bodman et 
al., 2009), as the older studies arguing for a link from economic performance to 
decentralisation and the newer ones arguing the reverse by using largely the same 
indicators and datasets (Blochliger et al. 2013). This unresolved issue has led to the 
problem of endogeneity and spurious regression when fiscal decentralisation is put 
as regressor in the estimable equation. Therefore, whether fiscal decentralisation 
granger causes economic growth or otherwise remains an empirical question. 
According to Sim (1980), if there is simultaneity among a number of variables 
employed then these variables in the same way, there should be no distinction 
between exogenous and endogenous variable i.e. all variables are treated as 
endogenous variables which led to development of VAR model. 
This study is focused on Nigeria simply because the country is one of the most 
decentralised nations in Africa. It is of greater priority to carry out this study in 
Nigeria because of current clamour for true federalism. More importantly, most 
studies on fiscal decentralisation-growth nexus have narrowly focused on either 
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explaining the pattern of intergovernmental relation (Mbanefoh, 1993) within 
limited context of political economy or using historical and idealistic perspective 
by employing merely narrative and descriptive tools to analysis unequal allocation 
of revenue and functions among tiers of government (see for example Akindele and 
Olaopa, 2002; Suberu, 1991). This methodology is grossly inadequate (World 
Bank, 1995). 
 
2. Empirical Methodology and Data  
2.1 Fiscal Decentralization Measure 
The study employed two measures of fiscal decentralization indicators. The 
expenditure and revenue decentralization measured as the share of sub-central 
expenditure (xt) and revenue (zt) in the general government expenditure and 
revenue respectively in Nigeria as widely used in the literatures. 
The history of Nigerian fiscal decentralization captured with the plot below depict 
that sub-national expenditure decentralization (SNED) is far more decentralized 
that sub-national revenue decentralization (SNRD). The plot clearly show sub-
national expenditure is higher than sub-national revenue in Nigeria. The federally 
allocated expenditures to sub-national is far more than its corresponding allocated 
revenue in Nigeria and this becomes manifest from the year 1999 when the up till 
date under the administration of a dominant political party known as People 
Democratic Party (PDP).  
Figure 1. Fiscal Decentralization Measures 
 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                        Vol 10, no 2, 2014 
 
 166 
 
2.2 Model Specification 
Unlike the simultaneous, or structural, equation models where variables are treated 
as endogenous and exogenous or predetermined (exogenous plus lagged 
endogenous), in vector autoregressive (VAR) models however, all the variables are 
treated as endogenous and as a result, there is no priori distinction between 
endogenous and exogenous variables. The VAR model is also used for structural 
inference and policy analysis. In structural analysis, certain assumptions about the 
causal structure of the data under investigation are imposed, and the resulting 
causal impacts of unexpected shocks or innovations to specified variables on the 
endogenous variables in the model can be analyzed. However, when variables 
involved are non-stationary at level then the application of VAR model is nullified 
and hence vector error correction model (VECM) which make it inevitable to test 
cointegration among the variables despite non-stationarity. For the purpose of this 
analysis, VECM(p) is formulated as follows: 
Yt =  1t......(1) 
Xt = 2t.....(2) 
Zt = 3t.            (3) 
Where i, j, k, = 1,2...........n 
 Economic development Yt is measured by the growth rate of real per capital and 
it are uncorrelated white-noise error term. The data set covers 41 years period of 
1970 to 2011 and were obtained and calculated from statistical bulletin published 
by central bank of Nigeria. As noted elsewhere, there is unidirectional causality 
that run from Xt to Yt if the estimated coefficients on the lagged Xt in equation are 
statistically different from zero as a group i.e.  in equation 1 and the 
estimated coefficients on the lagged Yt in equation 2 are not statistically different 
from zero i.e  = 0. If otherwise, then the causality runs from Yt to Xt and the 
relationship is bi-directional when  and   0. Zero relationship 
exist if  and  = 0. 
 
2.3 Multivariate Cointegration Analysis and Error Correction Modeling 
Since the cointegration analysis is fairly common and is well documented 
elsewhere (Banerjee, et. al 1993; Hylleberg and Mizon 1989; Engle and Granger 
1987; Johansen 1988; Johansen and Juselius 1990), we have only provided for 
summary here. According to Johansen (1988), multivariate cointegration model is 
based on the error correction representation given by:  
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Yt =  + Yt-i +  Yt–1+ εt................................................................... (4) 
Where Yt is an (nx1) column vector of ρ variables, μ is an (nx1) vector of constant 
terms, α and β captured coefficient matrices, Δ is a difference operator, and εt ~ 
IID(0, ). The coefficient matrix β is known as the impact matrix, and it contains 
information about the long-run relationships. Johansen‘s methodology requires the 
estimation of the VAR equations 1-3 above and the residuals are then used to 
compute two likelihood ratio (LR) test statistics that can be used in the 
determination of the unique cointegrating vectors of Yt. The cointegrating rank can 
be tested with two statistics: the trace test and the maximal eigenvalue test. 
 
3. The Empirical Results 
The study employed Dickey Fuller – Generalized Least Square (DF-GLS) test and 
Phillip – Perron (PP) test to determine the order of integration and the results 
showed that all variables employed I(1) series. The study proceeded by testing for 
long run relationship among the variables of interest using Johansen Cointeration 
Test which is presented below: 
Table 1. Johansen Cointegration Test 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigenvalue Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Max-
Eigen 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
None* 0.533201 42.78487 29.79707 28.18867 21.13162 
At most 1 0.247555 14.59620 15.49471 10.52383 14.26460 
At most 2* 0.104223 4.072376 3.841466 4.072376 3.841466 
Source: Computed by the Authors 2013 
From the table one above it is observed that both the trace test statistic and the 
Max-Eigenvalue test indicate one cointegrating equation at 5% level of significant. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis (Ho) which specifies that no cointegrating vectors is 
not accepted. Thus, there is long run relationship among the variable of interest. 
These variables are employed in the VAR model and the result is as follow: 
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Table 2. VEC Granger Causality Test 
Dependent variable: D(GDP)  
    
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob. 
    
D(LFDEXP) 1.059630 2 0.5887 
D(LFDREV) 1.421665 2 0.4912 
    
    
All 2.852206 4 0.5829 
    
Dependent variable: D(LFDEXP)  
    
    
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob. 
    
D(GDP) 0.202554 2 0.9037 
D(LFDREV) 0.258137 2 0.8789 
    
All 0.710824 4 0.9500 
    
Dependent variable: D(LFDREV)  
    
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob. 
    
    
D(GDP) 8.817940 2 0.0122** 
D(LFDEXP) 5.846024 2 0.0538 
    
All 10.90228 4 0.0277** 
    
Source: Computed by Authors 2013 
**Significant at 5% level of significant 
The table above displays the result of VEC causality test and from this table the 
causality runs from economic development to fiscal decentralization and not vice 
versa i.e. economic development granger causes fiscal decentralization in Nigeria 
at 5% level of significant. Sub-nationals revenue decentralization which is to some 
according to some authors
1
 a better indicator fiscal decentralization because it 
reflects sub-national government autonomy causes economic development and 
expenditure decentralization does not in Nigeria. 
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Table 4. Vector Diagnostic Test 
Various test Statistic p-value Remark 
Portmanteau test (5) Q-stat= 14.54106 
Adj Q-stat=15.84006 
0.9335 
0.8938 
Do not reject H0 
Normality test Jarque-bera stat = 
98.82813 
0.0000 Reject H0 
Heteroskedasticity test Chi-Sq = 152.0222 0.4460 Do not reject H0 
Source: computed by Authors, 2013 
In to corroborate the estimation process, the following validation diagnostic test 
was carried out purposely to cross check the stability of the model. The 
Portmanteau test was conducted to capture the existence of autocorrelation in the 
model and the result revealed that we should not reject null hypothesis which is an 
indication that there is no serial correlation in the error terms. Normality test is 
equally considered purposely to show may be model is normally distributed. The 
result also showed that null hypothesis was not accepted which is clear indication 
that normality assumption is not violated in the specified models by revealing that 
residuals are multivariate normal. Heteroskedasticity test was equally carried out 
ant the result showed that the models have constant variance by not rejecting null 
hypothesis of absence of heteroskedasticity.  
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper, empirically investigated long run and causal relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and economic development in Nigeria. Both descriptive and 
inferential statistics were employed in analyzing the relationship. The result from 
descriptive analysis showed that federal government has been assigned more 
expenditures than the allocation of revenue to sub-national government in Nigeria 
and this became pronounced under People Democratic Party (PDP) regime since 
1999 the party undertook power till date. The results of Johansen cointegration 
approach revealed that there is a long-run relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and economic development in Nigeria. Further results from a 
causality test showed that economic development causes fiscal decentralisation in 
Nigeria and not vice versa. The implication of this for policy makers is that the 
higher income per capita is the basis for the additional expenses for the provision 
of the new constitution in favor of the high degree of fiscal decentralisation, as a 
result economic development is expected to have positive effect on fiscal 
decentralization. The study therefore, recommends that emphasis should be placed 
on the indicators of economic welfare and development. 
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